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NOTES AND COMMENTS
v. First National Bank of Corsicana indicates a limitation of the
Beggs case to situations where the benefits may be wholly used for
either public or private purposes. Insofar as administration and
enforcement are concerned, appointment of trustees where needed
appears to be routine for the courts, and it would seem useless to
question the power of courts of equity over charitable trusts or
the authority of the Attorney General to invoke such power. In
order to prevent failure of charitable trusts, the courts will apply




R ECENTLY, two Texas decisions were handed down involving
constructive trusts. While neither decision contains anything
startling, they do illustrate the wide application of the constructive
trust doctrine. A few general observations concerning this doctrine
would seem appropriate prior to discussion of these Texas cases.
Trusts have been classified as express and implied. Express
trusts are composed of private and charitable trusts, whether
testamentary or inter vivos. Implied trusts, comprising both re-
sulting and constructive trusts, are imposed by law, sometimes
contrary to intentions, upon property under a given set of facts
and conditions. Constructive trusts are a remedial device, fash-
ioned in equity, to undo wrongful acts and prevent unjust enrich-
ment.
It is the usual rule that a constructive trust in land is not
affected by the Statute of Frauds, being expressly excepted in the
original statute.' The Texas Statute of Frauds omits mention of
trusts in land, and express oral trusts arising at the time of a con-
1 ChapL V11, Chas. If c.3 (1676).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
veyance, as well as implied trusts, were not affected by it.2 The
Texas Trust Act, passed in 1943, makes oral trusts in land unen-
forceable but provides that constructive and resulting trusts are
excepted from the operation of the Act.' The purpose of legisla-
tion making an oral agreement (contract or trust) concerning land
unenforceable is to eliminate from the courts contests involving
unreliable, perjured and conflicting oral evidence. The theory was
that the statute will cause persons who intend a trust to put it in
a writing and that absence of a writing generally will mean that
no trust was ever intended. Exceptions to the statutes requiring
trusts in land to be in writing were, perhaps, inevitable, and most
of them were brought under the doctrine of constructive trusts.
One may inquire as to the necessity for exceptions, as to the cir-
cumstances under which a constructive trust arises, and as to the
nature of a constructive trust.
Briefly, as to necessity, it appears that there are always in-
stances in which justice requires exceptions to statutory provisions
-to prevent persons from obtaining advantages by their own
wrongful acts and seeking to use the Statute of Frauds or other
similar legislation to maintain their gains. Caution is essential in
the use of the constructive trust, or its indiscriminate use would
defeat the purpose of these statutes. Therefore, it would appear
that two criteria underlie the propriety of its use. First, the case
must be one in which unjust enrichment and wrongdoing are pres.
ent. Second, the situation should be one in which the proof is
reliable.
As to the circumstances causing a constructive trust to arise,
it would seem that fraud, in its broadest sense, is the essential
basis on which the courts have imposed a trust." Grounds upon
2 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN (Vernon. 1925) art. 3995; Johnson v. Smith. 115 Tex.
193, 280 S. W. 158 (1926) ; and see Leakey v. Gunter, 25 Tex. 400, 403 (1860) ; Bagley v.
Pollock, 19 S. W. (2d) 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (referring specifically to construc-
tive trusts).
8 Gray v. Mills, 206 S. W. (2d) 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). affirmed. -Tex..,
210 S. W. (2d) 985 (1948); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1943) art. 7425b.
4 Gregory v. Bowlsby. 115 Iowa 327, 88 N. W. 822 (1902). 126 Iowa 588. 102 N. W.
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which the courts have sustained a constructive trust appear to be
fraudulent misrepresentations,' concealment,6 mistake,' undue in-
fluence, 8 duress, 9 criminal misappropriation, 0 breach of fiduciary
relation or obligation," breach of confidential relation, 2 and
others. As was said in McDonald v. Miller: 3
"A constructive trust will be imposed by a court in order to do equity
and prevent unjust enrichment when title to property is acquired by
fraud, duress, an undue influence, or is acquired or retained in viola-
tion of a fiduciary duty."
Judge Cardozo aptly defined a constructive trust in Beatty v. Gug-
genheim Exploration Company:"
"A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience
of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good con-
science retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee."
It should be remembered that such a trust arises by operation of
law-imposed by law upon the wrongdoer in favor of the wronged
517 (1905). (This case in general is concerned with the necessity of some positive fraud
being present.)
5 Faville v. Robinson, I11 Tex. 48, 227 S. W. 938 (1919).
Jones v. Lynch. 137 S. W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
7See Biggs v. Poling, 134 S. W. (2d) 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) writ of error dis-
missed, judgment correct; Simmons v. Wilson, 216 S. W. (2d) 847 (TeL Civ. App.
1949) (a very recent application of the rule where mistake was present).
8 Andrews v. Brown, 10 S. W. (2d) 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), afirming with direc-
tions 283 S. W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
9 Pope v. Garrett, -- Tex._, 211 S. W. (2d) 559 (1948); Day v. Mallard, 22
S. W. 164 (Tex. Com. App. 1921). affirming Mallard v. Day, 204 S. W. 245 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918).
10 First State Bank of Ellinger v. Zelesky. 262 S. W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
11 Edwards v. Strong ..... Tex_...... 213 S. W. (2d) 979 (1948); Berry v. Rhine,
205 S. W. (2d) 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
12 Gray v. Mills. 206 S. W. (2d) 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). affirmed, .... Tex.,
210 S. W. (2d) 985 (1948) ; Collins v. Griffith. 105 S. W. (2d) 895 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) ; Krenz v. Strohmeir. 177 S. W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) writ of error refused;
Landrum v. Landrum. 62 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 130 S. W. 907 (1910) writ of error refused;
Sinclair v. Purdy. 235 N. Y. 246. 139 N. E. 255 (1923).
Is73 N. D. 474. 16 N. W. (2d) 270. 272 (194).
14 255 N. Y. 380. 122 N. E. 378. 380 (1919).
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-regardless of the intentions of the parties involved. 5 This is
the distinguishing feature from other types of trusts; courts some-
times use the expressions "resulting trusts" and "constructive
trusts" indiscriminately, when, in fact, the former has present an
element of intent to create a beneficial interest.
As to the nature of a constructive trust, it appears that the
cestui quetrust acquires not merely an equitable right, but equit-
able title in the property."l And such trust arises at the time legal
title is obtained by the "trustee." 17 A purchaser of the property
from the wrongdoer, for value, in good faith and without notice,
will cut off the equitable title of the rightful owner."
Regarding the matter of application of the foregoing general
observations, two recent Texas cases appear to be in accord with
the results reached in most jurisdictions.
DURESS OR FRAuD
In the recent case of Pope v. Garrett" the deceased, Carrie
Simons, had indicated to her neighbor that she wished a will drawn
up in which all her property was to pass to the plaintiff. Since the
decedent was in poor physical health, the neighbor drew up the
will according to her wishes. The neighbor presented it to her,
after reading it aloud in the presence of decedent, a minister,
a friend of the plaintiff, a sister of decedent, two nieces of de-
cedent, and another. Immediately after the reading, in the presence
of all these witnesses, decedent declared that this was to be her
last will and testament. The jury found that a sister and a niece
"by physical force or by creating a disturbance" prevented the
I:, See Magee v. Young. 145 Tex. 485, 198 S. W. (2d) 883 (1947) ; Tex. Creosoting
Co. v. Hartburg Lumber Co., 12 S. W. (2d) 169 (Tex. Com. App. 1929) ; Spencer v.
Pettit, 17 S. W. (2d) 1102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). afirmed, 34 S. W. (2d) 798 (Tex.
Com. App. 1931).
16 Snyder v. Citizens State Bank, 184 S. W. (2d) 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944),
affirmed, Binford v. Snyder. 144 Tex. 134. 189 S. W. (2d) 471 (1945).
11 See Elbert v. Waples-Platter Co, 156 S. W. (2d) 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
writ of error refused.
18 See Texas Co. v. Miller. 165 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
29 -Tex.- 211 S. W. (2d) 559 (1948).
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signing of the will by decedent, and a few days afterwards she
died. Upon suit by plaintiff, the intended taker under the will,
against the heirs of the decedent, two questions presented them-
selves: 1) whether there should be a trust imposed or impressed
upon all the property intended for the plaintiff under the- terms
of the will, and, 2) whether, if the trust imposition was appro-
priate, it should be impressed upon the property inherited by all
the heirs, or only upon the property of those persons preventing
the execution of the will.
It was held, as to the first question, that this was a typical
situation in which the courts would impose a trust upon property
received by persons through fraud or other wrongful acts and
would allow the person rightfully entitled to the property to re-
ceive the beneficial interest therein as beneficiary of a constructive
trust. As to the second question, there was no question that the two
persons participating in the duress should not be allowed to retain
the property inherited. With respect to the other heirs, who were
innocent of the wrongdoing, the court noted a conflict in legal
opinion and held that they, too, should not be entitled to profit by
the wrongdoing of others.
It is to be reiterated that the general rule is that persons par.
ticipating in fraud, duress, and other wrongful actions, and ob-
taining legal title to property will be deemed trustees for the per-
sons who rightfully should have received the same."0 Incidentally,
it should be noted that there are cases holding that where a person
is prevented from receiving a bequest through such efforts of an-
other, who has profited thereby, the latter may be proceeded
against in an action in tort.
21
As to the second question in the case, the court recognizes the
conflict of authority, but agrees with the more modem cases as well
.0 Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 53 N. E. 767 (1899) ; Dixon v. Olmius, Chancery,
1 Cox. Eq. 414 (1787); RESTATEMENT, RSTITUTION, . 166, and Comment "f," § 184
(1937) and illustrations thereunder; 3 Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 489.4, 2371,
2372 (1939).
21 In general, see note, 98 A. L. R. 474 (1935).
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as the current legal writers. In the minority and older view, a
distinction is drawn between persons taking by joint tenancy and
persons taking as tenants in common. Where the promise to (or
fraud upon) the testator is made by one of joint tenants, all those
benefiting hold in trust for the person who should have received
the benefice. But where one tenant in common has perpetrated the
fraudulent devise to all, the others being innocent, then only the
wrongdoer is made a trustee of the property he has received.22 In
the principal case the innocent heirs, though taking as tenants in
common through statute, were made trustees of the property they
received. In accord with this view Bogert argues that if the trans-
action could be made safe from a constructive trust by having some
apparently innocent relative receive the benefits, the wrongdoer
would indirectly benefit where collusion is present."B And Scott
argues that the conflict is between the principles of unjust enrich-
ment and of enforcement of the Statute of Wills and believes that
the Statute of Wills should not be without exception. He takes the
position that innocent takers ought to hold in trust for the person
justly entitled, had the fraud not taken place. The Restatement
of the Law of Restitution" states, regarding property fraudulently
acquired through a will, or lack thereof:
".... In such a case [where the fraud is by a third person] the devisee
or legatee would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to take and
hold the property, even though he had no notice of the wrongful means
by which the devise or bequest was procured .... The situation is in
substance the same as though the third person had by fraud, duress,
... obtained a devise ... to himself and had gratuitously transferred it
to another."
22 Powell v. Yearance, 73 N. J. Eq. 117, 67 Atl. 892 (1907); Heinisch v. Pennington,
73 N. J. Eq. 456. 68 Adt. 233 (1907).
233 BoCERnT, TRtusIs AND TRusTFS, Part 1, 26 (1946 Ed).
24 3 Scotr. op. cit. supra note 20, § 489.4, 2375; Contra: Dye v. Parker, 108 Kan.
304, 194 Pac. 640 (1921) (where Statute of Wills prevailed and the innocent retained
iree of trust imposition).




The Texas Supreme Court noted the argument that those who
were not parties to the wrongdoing would be injured by the decree
declaring them, as well as the wrongdoers, trustees for the plain.
tiff. But, the Court answered, why allow the plaintiff to receive
less than was intended by the decedent, and why not allow plaintiff
the complete relief which the court of equity can decree? Further,
it should be noticed that in the principal case there was ample evi-
dence of disinterested witnesses to take the element of uncertainty
out of the holding and to observe necessary caution in employing
a constructive trust as the remedy.
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
Edwards v. Strong26 is a good example of a constructive trust
imposed upon the legal title to property which an agent, and
others acting with him, had acquired in breach of a fiduciary rela-
tionship. Mrs. Strong had employed one Athans to acquire an option
to a "key" lot from Griffin, the owner of the lot. The option was
acquired, but in Athans' name, and a short time later, within the
option period, the Edwards bought the lot in their own names
from Athans, the purchasers having knowledge of the transaction
between plaintiff and Athans. Suit followed by Mrs. Strong to have
them declared constructive trustees of the lot in her favor. De-
fendants argued that, since the option was oral in the first instance
and could not be enforced under the Statute of Frauds against
the lot owner, therefore it should not be enforced in court at this
time; defendants also argued that the agency employment was oral
and could not be enforced.
It was held that the unenforceability of the option with Griffin,
the lot owner, made no difference as to plaintiff, since Griffin had
conveyed the lot in question to the defendants. Further, it would
seem that this defense was a personal one for Griffin and not
available to defendants. The court then imposed a constructive trust
upon the legal title acquired by defendants, basing said trust upon
2. __Tex._., 213 S. W. (2d) 979 (1948).
1949]
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the agent's (Athans') breach of fiduciary relationship and upon
the Edwards' participation therein. The court also stated that
the defense that the agency contract was not in writing was waived
by defendants, they having raised this objection for the first time
upon appeal.
Where an oral contract to convey an interest in land is
breached and the prospective buyer seeks to enforce the contract
by specific performance or by imposition of a trust, the general
rule is that relief is denied because of the Statute of Frauds. 7
And where there is a parol agreement between the litigants to
share in the profits of a sale of a farm, defendants to purchase and
sell the same, there is no basis for a constructive trust, for the
same reason.2" However, the situation is different where an agent
breaches a pre-existing fiduciary relationship with his principal. 9
It would appear that the modem rule is that where one person
is in a fiduciary relation to another and obtains property in viola-
tion of such duty, that person will be held to be a constructive
trustee of the property for his principal."0 But it is well to note
the possible variations which Bogert points out regarding the
agency relationship:"
1) where there is an agency relationship by contract between
two persons and the agent is to negotiate with the land owner
(the situation of the principal case);
2) where there is an agency contract, and the principal pre-
viously had a contract with the land owner, and the agent has only
to complete the details. Here the principal already has equitable
title and can enforce the agreement against his agent should the
latter procure a conveyance to himself;
27 Bentley v. Young, 147 Ga. 373. 94 S. E. 221 (1917) : Modern Baking Co. v. Or-
ringer, 271 Pa. 152, 114 Atil. 264 (1921) ; 3 BocEsr, op. cit. supra note 23, § 479, 60.2
s Purvis v. Hardin. 343 Mo. 652. 122 S. W. (2d) 936 (1938).
29 Kinzbach Tool Company v. Corbett-Wallace Corporation, 138 Tex. 565, 160 S. W.
(2d) 509 (1942).
30 RESTATEMENT, REsrr noN, 1 190 generally, and § 194 (1) and (2) specifically
(1937).
83 3 BocrRT. op. cit. supra note 23, § 487, 122-127.
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3) where the agency contract is present, but the agent pre-
viously had a contract with the land owner. Here, it would appear
that the agency contract would be regarding a land interest con-
veyance (the principal knowing of the agent's contract with the
land owner) bringing it within the Statute of Frauds.
As to the first situation, there appear to be two lines of au-
thority. The older, and probably the minority, view would refuse
to allow a constructive trust to be imposed upon the agent, when
there is no writing to show such agency relationship, on the ground
that such a contract is within the Statute of Frauds.32 The other
view, and seemingly the majority, treats the situation from the
breach of agency standpoint-breach of fiduciary relations, or
trust and confidence-and imposes a constructive trust upon the
property acquired by the agent in favor of his principal."3 The Re.
statement of the Law of Restitution34 recognizes the argument
regarding the Statute of Frauds but dismisses it by saying that the
enforcement is not of the oral promise or undertaking but of the
breach of fiduciary obligation. Bogert argues along the same lines
that since the contract is that the agent will procure the transfer of
land from a third person and not that the agent himself will convey
the property to his principal, such transaction does not come within
the Statute of Frauds. 5 The modem rule, applicable to the prin-
cipal case, is also stated in the Restatement of the Law of Agency."6
32 Mitchell v. Wright, 155 Ala. 458, 46 So. 473 (1908); Day v. Amburgey, 147 Ky.
123, 143 S. W. 1033 (1912) ; Dougan v. Bemis, 95 Minn. 220, 103 N. W. 882 (1905).
-m Magnolia Pet. Co. v. Taylor. 173 S. W. (2d) 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) writ of
error refused; Johnson v. Hayward. 103 N. W. 1058. 74 Neb. 157. 107 N. W. 384 (1906).
31 Comment "d," § 194, 798: "Where one person orally undertakes to purchase land
on behalf of another, it may be urged that the other cannot enforce a constructive trust
because the undertaking is oral and there is no compliance with the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds. The answer to this objection is that the other is not enforcing an
oral contract, but is enforcing a constructive trust based upon the violation of fiduciary
duty.., the relation may arise although its creation is not evidenced by a written
instrument, even though the agent is to purchase land for his principal." Should the
agent buy for himself, then he holds the property in constructive trust for his prin-
cipal. But this, the Restatement adds, is applicable anly where he undcrtakes to buy
as agent for the other.
35 3 BoceaT, op. cit. supra note 23, § 487. 126.
36 § 414 (2), and the Illustrations under Comment on-Subsection (2) with nearly
the same facts as in the principal case.
